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The summer 2020 issue of the journal Educational Psychologist 
(volume 55, issue 3) was entirely devoted to the identification, 
description, and elimination of the spread of false information, 
an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in the Internet age that is 
labeled as the communication of “post-truth.”  While conceptions 
of post-truth are dynamic and somewhat ambiguous, generally 
post-truth is defined as what happens when individuals prior-
itize personal beliefs and experience above facts and evidence, 
combined with the inability of individuals to decipher scientific 
fact from fiction (Barzilai & Chinn, 2020). The reason that false 
information perpetuates is primarily a consequence of individuals 
debating the existence or integrity of evidence while concurrently 
relying on emotionally charged opinions instead of upon evidence 
from replicable scientific studies (Sinatra & Lombardi, 2020).  
Conspicuously absent from this volume of empirical research 
on post-truth was a discussion concerning the misconceptions 
held by current or prospective educators about their own disci-
pline, educational psychology, which is devoted to the study 
of optimal methods for teaching, learning, and student motiva-
tion. Barzilai and Chinn (2020) indicated that “educators have 
been interested in how well students and teachers are prepared 
for dealing with post-truth phenomena and how to boost 
their preparedness” (p. 110).  Yet many educators fail to realize, 
acknowledge, or discuss that the messages they send to their 
own students may not be evidence-based, but instead are of a 
personal nature, substantiated primarily by individual, group, or 
cultural experience and augmented by entrenched beliefs devel-
oped over a lifetime. 
Unjustified beliefs, or beliefs explicitly contradicted by scien-
tific evidence, are often termed “misconceptions,” alternatively 
identified as preconceptions, personal epistemologies, alternative 
frameworks, naïve science, or mistaken and epistemically unwar-
ranted beliefs, and motivated reasoning (Gardner & Brown, 2013; 
Hamza & Wickman, 2008; Hughes, Lyddy, & Lambe, 2013; Lobato, 
Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014; Lombardi, Nussbaum, & Sinatra, 
2016; Kowalski & Taylor, 2019; Muis et al., 2020, Sinatra, Kienhues, 
& Hofer, 2014). Misconceptions differ from scientific ambiguities, 
which are claims that do not have clear empirical support (G. M. 
Sinatra, personal communication, May 21, 2014), and exclude lack 
of domain knowledge and implicit self-beliefs. Misconceptions 
do not occur by lack of exposure to certain topics but materi-
alize when fallacious knowledge must be ‘unlearned’ to create 
an evidence-based understanding of a phenomenon or concept. 
The impact of misconceptions is profound. Misconceptions 
and science illiteracy among the general public leads to poor 
decision-making contrary to the best interests of society and the 
individuals within it (Sinatra et al., 2014), resulting in compromised 
judgment, irrational thinking, and the inability to learn new and 
accurate information (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002). Science miscon-
ceptions include dubious perceptions of climate change, question-
ing the suitability of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) for 
the food supply, and parents circumventing vaccinations for their 
children, despite the confluence of contrary scientific evidence. 
Misconceptions both inside and outside the classroom have a 
significant impact on society, whether the belief is about human 
intelligence, brain-based instruction, or as simple as understand-
ing how HIV/AIDS is transmitted and what the true outcome of 
infection is considering medical science (Johnson & Sinatra, 2014). 
Even highly educated K-12 in-service teachers with the best of 
intentions disseminate misconceptions about topics such as learn-
ing styles (Pashler, McDaniel, Rohrer, & Bjork, 2008), brain-based 
education initiatives (Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, & Jolles, 2012; 
Im, Cho, Dubinsky & Varma, 2018), and general student learning 
(Kirschner & van Merriënboer, 2013), despite a dearth of empirical 
support and substantial evidence to the contrary.
The misconceptions of teachers at all levels are especially 
egregious because teacher beliefs exert direct influence upon 
curriculum development, pedagogy, and the construction of effec-
tive learning environments (Woolfolk Hoy, Davis, & Pape, 2006). 
Teachers harboring misconceptions about teaching and learning 
may perpetuate those false beliefs upon their students (Hughes 
et al., 2015; Sadler & Sonnert, 2016). Extant research in educa-
tional psychology has frequently investigated teacher beliefs 
(Buehl & Fives, 2009; Fives & Buehl, 2008; Fives & Buehl, 2012) 
and prior research has established the existence of misconcep-
tions in psychology (Gardner & Brown, 2013; Kowalski & Taylor, 
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2017; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010), science (Brough-
ton, Sinatra, & Nussbaum, 2013; Cordova, Sinatra, Jones, Taasoob-
shirazi, & Lombardi, 2014; Heddy & Sinatra, 2013; Lombardi & 
Sinatra, 2012; Smolleck & Hershberger, 2011; Sinatra et al., 2014; 
Vosniadou, Ioannides, Dimitrakopoulou, & Papademetriou, 2001), 
mathematics (Green, Piel, & Flowers, 2008; Ryan & McCrae, 2005), 
and neuromyths (Dekker et al., 2012; Pickering & Howard-Jones, 
2007; Im et al., 2018). However, to date, no published review 
on the development of pedagogical beliefs systems (Schommer, 
1990) has addressed the existence, strength, description, measure-
ment, or mediation of misconceptions about teaching, learning, 
and academic motivation (i.e., educational psychology) among 
pre-service teachers despite the substantial importance of “reflex-
ive deliberation” upon teaching practice and effectiveness (Lunn 
Brownlee, Ferguson, & Ryan, 2017). 
Thus, the purpose of this review is to highlight the litera-
ture gap regarding misconceptions by reviewing and evaluating 
what has already been learned about unjustified beliefs in psychol-
ogy and education and applying that knowledge to educational 
psychology misconceptions. Thus, rather than provide an exhaus-
tive review of the extant work in pseudoscience (e.g., ghosts, 
extraterrestrials, or the paranormal), public misconceptions of 
science, metaphysical beliefs, psychological misconceptions, post-
truth or efforts to mediate these false beliefs, this review explores 
the educational psychology misconceptions potentially held by 
pre-service teachers and primarily, but not exclusively embraced 
by K-12 in-service teachers. The explicit purpose of this review is 
to create greater awareness concerning the types of educational 
psychology misconceptions educators may harbor, as the first 
step toward eradicating false beliefs about teaching, learning, and 
academic motivation. In addition, we highlight the practical impli-
cations associated with teacher misconceptions and outline key 
measurement criteria that will allow researchers to accurately 
assess existing educational psychology misconceptions. 
METHODOLOGY
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The concentration here is on existing literature and research on 
‘misconceptions,’ ‘myths,’ and ‘legends’ within the psychology and 
education disciplines. The secondary emphasis is on the theoreti-
cal, inferential, and measurement concerns. Search procedures for 
existing work in misconceptions related to educational psychol-
ogy constructs primarily included a review of articles published 
in four prominent educational psychology journals: Contemporary 
Educational Psychology, Educational Psychologist, Educational Psychology 
Review, and the Journal of Educational Psychology. To gather articles 
from the general education and psychology disciplines, broader 
searches of academic databases were performed through ERIC, 
EBSCOHost, and Google Scholar for the following terms both 
singularly and in various combinations: misconception(s), myth(s), 
legend(s), teacher(s), educator(s), learning, belief(s), epistemic and 
epistemological beliefs, and conceptual change. 
While empirical studies were of primary importance, we 
also evaluated existing literature reviews discovered through 
our search, viewing them as frameworks for the discipline. Using 
the above-listed search parameters, we discovered 135 peer-re-
viewed, English language articles of potential relevance to our 
inquiry.  After excluding articles not explicitly related to miscon-
ceptions, education, conceptual change, beliefs, refutational text, or 
psychology, 96 articles remained for synthesis. We also performed 
footnote chases based on the bibliographic references for each 
manuscript in search of other potentially useful sources and to 
furnish a historical background to each discipline’s approach to 
identifying, measuring, and mitigating misconceptions. We have 
not attempted to produce an exhaustive methodological review, 
as many of the early misconception instruments provided faulty 
inferences.
This review includes a discussion of the extant and occasion-
ally intersecting attempts to study misconceptions in two distinct 
disciplines. We first define misconceptions, then discuss them 
in each respective field as studied in psychology and education. 
Thereafter, we examine issues and considerations for the devel-
opment of methodologically appropriate instruments to identify 
misconceptions, and a summary and analysis of completed work. 
Additionally, we add a brief commentary on the importance of 
epistemic aims when developing teachers and include recom-
mendations for future research in areas related to the forma-
tion, dissemination, and measurement of educational psychology 
misconceptions. 
Definitions and Descriptions 
of Misconceptions
Over the past four decades, misconceptions have been labeled and 
defined in numerous ways. The psychology and education fields 
define misconceptions differently, often neglecting to indicate 
operationalized application or how the misconception influences 
professional practice. Simplistic definitions for misconceptions 
in psychology included “mistaken beliefs” (Gardner & Dalsing, 
1986, p. 33; Gardner & Hund, 1983, p. 20), “common misbeliefs” 
(McCutcheon, 1991, p. 647), and “rules of thumb” (Chew, 2006, 
p. 212). In the field of psychology, misconceptions are defined as 
“widely held beliefs contradicted by established evidence” (Gard-
ner & Brown, 2013, p. 211) and as “inaccurate claims that lack 
empirical support” (Hughes et al., 2015, p. 34). The science educa-
tion literature defines a misconception as “a belief that conflicts 
with currently accepted scientific explanations” (Tippett, 2010, p. 
953) and as “notions that are in sharp contrast to accepted scien-
tific understanding” (Sinatra et al., 2014, p. 132). Neuromyths are 
strikingly similar to misconceptions, and commonly defined as 
“popular beliefs about what brain science can actually deliver to 
education” (Goswami, 2004, p. 2) or “popular accounts of brain 
functioning which originate in valid scientific evidence that has 
been extrapolated beyond the existing data” (Geake, 2008, p. 124). 
Misconceptions are primarily researched in psychology and 
content-area education (e.g., misconceptions about mathematics 
concepts), however within educational psychology the bulk of 
empirical investigation is primarily focused on science education. 
Science education research primarily addresses misconceptions 
by investigating the constructs of epistemic cognition, epistemic 
beliefs, motivated reasoning, plausibility judgments, and concep-
tual change. In aggregate, these constructs represent individual 
beliefs, mental models, and worldviews about controversial or 
politically-motivated beliefs about topics such as climate change 
and genetically-modified organism labeling (Sinatra et al., 2014), 
the continued classification of Pluto as a planet (Broughton et 
al., 2013), HIV/AIDS (Johnson & Sinatra, 2014), and the ability to 
revise those beliefs when confronted with contradictory evidence 




Sinatra et al. defined epistemic beliefs as “the beliefs people 
hold about the nature of knowledge and knowing” (2014, p. 126), 
which function to some extent as a naïve or intuitive theory about 
scientific information and knowledge, not unlike popular but erro-
neous perceptions of psychology as nothing more than common 
sense (Furnham, Callahan, & Rawles, 2003). Epistemic beliefs play 
a critical role in an individual’s interpretation of scientific mate-
rial and are particularly relevant when faced with contradictory 
information or explanations that must be incorporated into their 
existing knowledge due to the influence these beliefs have upon 
the individual’s ability to reason about that knowledge (Sinatra 
et al., 2014). One of the most prevalent examples regarding the 
influence of epistemic beliefs are attitudes related to evolution, 
with some teachers embracing absolutist, dogmatic religious 
beliefs (Trani, 2004) that inhibit the scientific understanding and 
teaching of natural selection (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, 
& Demastes, 2003).
Aspiring and developing educators also harbor epistemic 
stances and epistemic aims that influence knowledge formation 
goals and the sustainability of their teaching beliefs. Epistemic aims 
refer to what principles and knowledge individuals deem import-
ant for teaching and learning success (Barzilai & Chinn, 2018), 
while epistemic stances justify the importance of developing 
pedagogical knowledge (Ferguson & Brownlee, 2018). These goals 
and aims are integral to the formation of teaching and learning 
strategies because the developing knowledge “mediates how they 
(teachers) conceive of and engage in teaching” (Lunn Brownlee 
et al., 2017, p. 242). From a lay perspective, epistemic stances and 
aims are worldviews that influence how thinking and reasoning 
intertwine to influence normative behavior inside and outside of 
the classroom. Educators who have epistemic aims that conflict 
with empirical evidence may use unreliable thinking and flawed 
reasoning during instructional episodes, thereby inspiring faulty 
epistemological perspectives in their developing students. 
An additional factor contributing to people’s misunderstand-
ing of scientific information is motivated reasoning.  According to 
Kunda (1990), motivation plays a role in the direction and inten-
sity of cognitive processing. Sinatra et al. (2014) explained that 
although people can make a good faith attempt to be rational in 
scientific decision making, they may still be hampered by moti-
vated reasoning as “motivations bias what information they attend 
to and what strategies they use to construct, assess, and evaluate 
that information” (p. 129). For instance, a teacher may believe 
in the concept of learning styles and revise their pedagogical 
approach under the false pretense that tailoring their instruc-
tion to individual learning styles will positively impact student 
learning outcomes. When faced with empirical data suggesting 
that the accommodation of learning styles has a null or nega-
tive effect on student learning outcomes (Willingham, Hughes, & 
Dobolyi, 2015), the teacher feels an immediate personal conse-
quence posing a threat to their teaching efficacy. They are there-
fore likely to reject or ignore the evidence-based information and 
discount the scientific evidence (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Even in 
the face of disconfirming evidence, teachers exhibit personal bias 
and filter out information inconsistent with their existing beliefs 
(Fives & Buehl, 2012). Further, basic human physiology underlies 
the maintenance of personal bias through the brain’s perceptual 
filter that regulates the degree of attention allotted to incoming 
information (Lee & Sherman, 2008). To preserve an established 
(and inaccurate) belief, the teacher is likely to selectively ignore 
scientific evidence through both psychological and physiological 
information filtering. 
Misconceptions are also influenced by flawed thinking 
processes (Lilienfeld, Lynn, Namy, & Woolf, 2009). Humans are 
vulnerable to logical and thinking fallacies often described as 
cognitive biases, because of the tendency to erroneously identify, 
categorize, evaluate, and interpret evidence. Misinterpretation 
primarily occurs when individuals attribute causality to events 
that are merely related (spurious correlation), when fixating on 
evidence that supports their beliefs while ignoring or rejecting 
contradictory evidence (confirmation bias), and when encounter-
ing evidence that implicates negative self-impressions (self-justi-
fication bias). In these situations, individuals discount objective 
knowledge and evidence because dissonance is perceived as a 
threat leading to stress and anxiety, feelings that abate when the 
misconception is embraced (Gregoire, 2003). 
Misconceptions may also perpetuate due to structural 
misclassification of acquired information. Often described as an 
ontological perspective of mental representation, when an individ-
ual inappropriately relates new information to existing knowledge, 
distortions may develop. Thus, a teacher who is elated over the 
accomplishments of a struggling student may erroneously catego-
rize the newfound success as the result of teaching the learner in 
the learner’s preferred learning style, in contrast to categorizing 
student success based on the development of a flawless lesson 
plan. Individuals must possess both the ability and willingness to 
recognize misclassification as a prerequisite to modify represen-
tations and promote conceptual change (Alexander, 2017; Chi, 
2005; Murphy & Mason, 2006).
The continued acceptance of misconceptions can be 
described as an evaluation of plausibility, in which plausibility 
judgments play a critical role in the maintenance and revision of 
misconceptions.  An accurate explanation must first seem plausi-
ble to a misconception-bearing individual before they are willing 
to accept it as valid and consider altering their engrained although 
inaccurate belief. Lombardi et al., defined plausibility judgments 
as “a judgment of potential truthfulness when evaluating expla-
nations” (2016, p. 35), such that if an individual does not find an 
explanation plausible, the potential for accepting the explanation 
is temporary at best. For instance, if a teacher doubts the plausibil-
ity of evidence-based information negating the belief that accom-
modating learning styles in the classroom facilitates academic 
achievement, what may result is only “provisional acceptance” of 
the explanation (Lombardi et al., 2016, p. 36). If teachers doubt 
the plausibility of evidence-based information related to effective 
instructional strategies or learning contexts, a tendency to disre-
gard the accurate explanation and information follows. 
Overcoming misconceptions comprise the emphasis of most 
conceptual change models. The conceptual change approach is 
often employed in science education to facilitate “the restruc-
turing of individuals’ knowledge to overcome their misconcep-
tions and align their understanding with scientifically accepted 
ideas” (Sinatra et al., 2014, p. 132), and is successfully achieved 
through various instructional approaches including refutational 
text (Broughton, Sinatra, & Reynolds, 2010; Sinatra & Broughton, 
2011; Tippett, 2010), lecture (Bensley, Lilienfeld, & Powell, 2014; 
Kowalski & Taylor, 2009; Taylor & Kowalski, 2017), dialogue-based 
refutation and argumentation (Braten, Muis, & Reznitskaya, 2017) 
and through conscious reflection and reflexivity whereby learn-
ers explicitly evaluate their thought processes and reasoning 
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(Alexander, 2017; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2017).  Although multiple 
conceptual change models exist that are beyond the scope of this 
review (e.g., Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Gregoire, 2003; Pintrich, Marx, 
& Boyle, 1993; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982), consis-
tent elements appear across models that focus on how learners 
construct flawed representations and how those misrepresenta-
tions can be mediated. 
Mental models represent a conglomerate of various beliefs 
and emotions that individuals employ to appraise the legitimacy 
of the information with their current beliefs. These models focus 
on characteristics of the learner such as strength, coherence, and 
commitment to their existing conception, motivation to process 
new information (Pintrich et al., 1993), social context (Dole & 
Sinatra, 1998), and affective factors when attempting to change the 
beliefs of teachers (Gregoire, 2003; Muis et al., 2018).  Additionally, 
the complexity, coherence, and plausibility of the accepted scien-
tific explanations for various phenomena are important consid-
erations during the change process. Most of the research in the 
conceptual change literature is designed to determine which strat-
egies or instructional techniques are best for fostering accurate 
comprehension (Kendeou & van den Broek, 2005; Chinn, Rinehart, 
& Buckland, 2014) and potentially eliminating the misconception. 
Based on the totality of the literature in epistemic cognition, 
epistemic beliefs, motivated reasoning, plausibility judgments, and 
conceptual change research, misconceptions have been addressed 
in a multitude of ways.  Across these topics, the general theme 
encompasses false beliefs that require revision and methods for 
creating belief change. The cross-discipline diversity in miscon-
ceptions research warrants a clear definition here. Therefore, 
based upon the variation in misconceptions emphasis within and 
across strands of literature, for the purposes of this paper we 
defined educational psychology misconceptions as entrenched 
beliefs related to teaching, learning, and academic motivation that 
are explicitly refuted by multiple strands of methodologically-sound 
empirical evidence. 
Psychology
Misconceptions. Various psychology misconceptions have been 
proposed including a variety of items related to personality, the 
nature of mental illness, and abnormal human behavior. Miscon-
ceptions found in the psychology literature often include: (a) the 
efficacy of inkblot tests in revealing personality traits, (b) the 
conception of schizophrenics as harboring multiple personalities, 
(c) the influence of a full moon on psychiatric hospital admis-
sions and crimes, (d) the utility of polygraph tests in detecting 
dishonesty, (e) the folk notion that opposites attract, and (f) the 
effectiveness of hypnosis in helping individuals retrieve forgotten 
memories (Hughes et al., 2013b; Standing & Huber, 2003).  Addi-
tional psychological misconceptions specifically related to human 
learning included the myth that human brains operate at a capacity 
of only 10%, playing classical music to infants will increase their 
intelligence (the Mozart effect), individuals are exclusively left- 
or right-brained (hemisphericity), and that people can learn new 
information while they sleep (Bangerter & Heath, 2004; Brown, 
1983; Della Sala, 1999; Higbee & Clay, 1998; Hughes et al., 2013b; 
Lyddy & Hughes, 2012; Standing & Huber, 2003).  Although prior 
work in psychology has superficially investigated some miscon-
ceptions tied to concepts of educational psychology, there has 
not been a clear delineation of one branch of psychology from 
the other. 
History. The study of psychological misconceptions is 
not a novel or contemporary endeavor.  Although superstitions 
were studied in the early 1900s (Conklin, 1919; Dresslar, 1910), 
misconceptions about psychology were formally addressed begin-
ning in the 1920s (Garrett & Fisher, 1926), and formal tests to 
measure misconceptions of psychology were developed contin-
uously into the 1970s (Holley & Buxton, 1950; McKeachie, 1960; 
Vaughan, 1977). These early instruments were composed of 80 
to 100 inaccurate statements related to psychology and required 
respondents to indicate whether each statement was true or 
false, setting the stage for future research on psychology miscon-
ceptions. The later 1970s and 1980s witnessed a proliferation 
of research about psychology misconceptions among diverse 
samples including high-performing college students (Best, 1982), 
introductory psychology students (Brown, 1983), university faculty 
(Gardner & Hund, 1983), and undergraduate students (Gardner 
& Dalsing, 1986; Lamal, 1979). 
The 1990s led to an abundance of misconception research, 
including a new and improved test of misconceptions (McCutch-
eon, 1991), examinations of critical thinking, academic achievement, 
and misconception frequency (McCutcheon, Apperson, Hanson, & 
Wynn, 1992), the existence of misconceptions among prospective 
psychology students (Furnham, 1992), a comparison of miscon-
ceptions among psychology and non-psychology students (Furn-
ham, 1993), and a cross-national investigation of misconceptions 
between American and British students (McCutcheon, Furnham, 
& Davis, 1993).  Although the studies varied in population and 
measurement approaches, the prolific nature of misconceptions 
about psychology were reported across studies. The literature 
during this era focused primarily on measuring the existence of 
misconceptions rather than mitigating the inaccurate beliefs or 
making inferences about other constructs related to the mainte-
nance of these misconceptions. 
Contemporary Application.  Accordingly, it has long been 
established that misconceptions and popular myths about psychol-
ogy have been examined using diverse samples (Lilienfeld et al., 
2010).  As exhibited in Table 1, psychological misconceptions have 
often been examined among undergraduate students in terms of 
their existence and frequency (Amsel, Baird, & Ashley, 2011; Glass, 
Bartels, Ryan, & Stark-Wroblewski, 2008; Higbee & Clay, 1998; 
Kowalski & Taylor, 2004; Kuhle, Barber, & Bristol, 2009; Standing & 
Huber, 2003; Thompson & Zamboanga, 2004). More recently, the 
area of psychological misconceptions has trended toward sub-dis-
ciplinary areas such as behavior analysis (Arntzen, Lokke, Lokke, 
& Eilertsen, 2010; Lamal, 1995) and forensic psychology (Shaw & 
Woodworth, 2013).  Additional work has also included miscon-
ceptions about psychology as a science (Amsel et al., 2011), the 
efficacy of a psychology course in remediating misconceptions 
about psychology (Glass et al., 2008; Standing & Huber, 2003), 
the predictive ability of misconceptions on course performance 
(Kuhle et al., 2009), and prior knowledge, aptitude, critical think-
ing, and ability as predictors of misconceptions (Kowalski & Taylor, 
2004; Thompson & Zamboanga, 2004). It is well-established that 
misconceptions about psychology exist, and the shift in recent 
literature has been toward more effective measurement of the 
misconceptions as well as predicting and correcting the inaccurate 
beliefs. Prior instruments have been criticized based upon validity 
concerns related to dichotomized true/false response formats 
as well as ambiguously phrased and outdated items.  Additionally, 




Table 1.  Empirical studies of psychology misconceptions
Citation Year Purpose(s) Measurement Finding(s) Sample 
Standing & 
Huber 2003
Determined the extent of myth 
acceptance as it related to the 
amount of college-level psycholo-
gy education
20-item Test Your 
Psychology IQ question-
naire, true/false response 
format
Rejection of myths increased with 
university psychology courses, but de-
creased considerably with the number 




a liberal-arts college 
enrolled in at least one 
psychology course at 




Evaluated whether psychological 
misconceptions decreased upon 
completion of an introductory 
psychology course, and whether 
GPA and critical thinking ability 
predicted decreases in post-test 
misconceptions
36-item questionnaire 
to assess psychological 
misconceptions, true/false 
response format 
A statistically significant change in stu-
dents’ misconceptions occurred after 
completing the introductory psycholo-
gy course. Students who thought more 
critically and performed at higher aca-




ogy students enrolled 






2008 Generalized Standing and Huber’s (2003) findings
20-item Test Your 
Psychology IQ question-
naire, true/false response 
format
Findings indicated that Midwestern 
Americans were more prone to myth 
acceptance and there were no signifi-
cant differences between the university 
and junior college student samples, and 
were inconsistent with Standing and 
Huber’s (2003) findings. 
N = 295 
Midwestern Americans 
enrolled in a university 
(n = 171), junior college 
(n = 79), as well as a 







Determined existence of students’ 
misconceptions about core 
beliefs in psychology, and whether 
their psychology knowledge was 
changed via conceptual change 
post-instruction; assessed whether 
scientific and intuitive beliefs 
about the discipline could be 
prompted in alternate contexts 
(professor perspective vs. self-per-
spective)
15-item Psychology as a 
Science (PAS) Question-
naire, seven-point Likert 
agreement scale response 
format
Found that students in the randomly 
assigned professor perspective group 
rated psychology as more scientific 
than those in the self-perspective 
condition. 
n = 227 
Introductory psychol-
ogy students enrolled 
in six different class 
sections 
Kuhle, Barber, & 
Bristol 2009
Evaluated whether psychology 
undergraduates harbored miscon-
ceptions about psychology, and 
related the misconceptions to 
performance in the introductory 
psychology course. 
10-item Knowledge of 
Psychology Test (adapted 
from Vaughan, 1977), true/
false response format
A significant negative correlation was 
found between number of misconcep-
tions held and the course grade, as 83% 




enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses 
Amsel, Baird, & 
Ashley 
2011
Determined beliefs about the 
scientific nature of psychology as 
a discipline, and assessed those 
beliefs as a function of year in 
college and academic status in 
psychology 
15-item Psychology as a 
Science (PAS) Question-
naire, seven-point Likert 
agreement scale response 
format
Found that more academically 
advanced students and students who 
were potential or actual psychology 
majors harbored stronger beliefs in the 
discipline of psychology as a science, af-
ter accounting for gender and number 
of psychology courses completed. 
n = 438
American undergradu-
ate psychology students 
Lyddy & 
Hughes 2012
Examined students’ beliefs about 
psychology at different stages of 
their undergraduate careers, and 
determined whether belief in 
psychology as a scientific discipline 
increased with experience in the 
subject. 
15-item Psychology as a 
Science (PAS) Question-
naire, seven-point Likert 
agreement scale response 
format 
26-item Revised Paranor-
mal Beliefs Scale (R-PBS), 
seven-point Likert 




naire, seven-point Likert 
agreement scale response 
format
No relationship was found between 
misconception endorsement and 
greater appreciation of psychology as 
a science, and misconceptions were 
still endorsed even after substantial 
experience in the field of psychology. 
However, students with more experi-
ence in psychology did have stronger 
beliefs in psychology as a science, but 




enrolled in introductory 
psychology courses for 
various time frames 
including four months 
(n = 83), 18 months (n 




Compared true/false and forced 
choice response formats and 
determined whether different 
formats led to different estimates 






forced choice (A or B) 
format 
Accuracy levels were different between 
the true/false format (33.05%) and 
the forced choice format (41.29%), indi-
cating that the true/false format led to 
overestimation of students’ miscon-
ceptions. A statistically significant dif-
ference was found for accuracy when 
comparing the true/false and forced 
choice formats.
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be highly vulnerable to acquiescence and correct guesses (Griggs 
& Ransdell, 1987; Hughes, Lyddy, & Kaplan, 2013; Ruble, 1986; Taylor 
& Kowalski, 2012).
Across the contemporary psychology literature three 
misconception themes emerged: (a) the interest in perceptions 
of psychology as a science, (b) the relationship between disci-
pline-specific knowledge levels and frequency of disciplinary 
misconceptions, and (c) the impact of discipline-based instruction 
in effectively correcting misconceptions. Five of the listed studies 
utilized a true/false response format to identify misconceptions 
among the various populations, while four studies employed a 
Likert-type scale to identify and measure the intensity of the 
misconceptions. However, even among college samples, ambi-
guity prevails regarding differences in misconception frequency. 
Similarities among studies included the heightened perception of 
psychology as a science among those with more advanced educa-
tion, and decreased acceptance of misconceptions among those 
with higher course grades and critical thinking skills. 
Summary.  Although many definitions and approaches for 
measuring misconceptions of psychology have been devised over 
the years, the same thread of inquiry has been maintained and 
ties the literature together: the identification and measurement of 
inaccurate beliefs about empirically-supported findings in the field 
of psychology.  While this brief review of the existing literature in 
psychology misconceptions exhibits the clear disciplinary interest 
in the topic of misconceptions, a gap remains for misconceptions 
about educational psychology among teachers, specifically related 
to topics of teaching, learning, and academic motivation. Recently, 
the gap has narrowed by research on educational ‘neuromyths,’ 
discussed next.
Neuroscience and Education
The improvement of education and student learning outcomes is 
an often addressed topic of social concern. However, many people 
harbor misguided notions about how to effectuate improvement 
in these areas, and seemingly simple ideas to improve the student 
learning experience and outcomes are sensationalized through 
popular media, social media, and word-of-mouth. The term ‘neuro-
myth’ describes the false beliefs developed about the human brain 
related to learning resulting from the intersection of neurosci-
ence and education (Organisation for Economic Cooperation, 
and Development, 2002). In the more specific field of educa-
tional psychology,  ‘urban legends’ and ‘urban myths’ are addressed, 
comprising neuromyths and myths about learning, technology 
in learning, and educational policy (de Bruyckere, Kirschner, & 
Hulshof, 2015; Kirschner & van Merriënboer, 2013). Due to the 
similarities and paucity of other research in this area, the fields of 
neuroscience and education are thus addressed as one topic here. 
Neuromyths proliferate because they are often initiated by an 
empirical principle with some underlying neuroscientific substan-
tiation but are misinterpreted and subsequently communicated 
to the layperson.  The underlying neuroscience is embellished and 
misapplied to educational endeavors with the intention of advanc-
ing teaching and learning outcomes, resulting in further prolifera-
tion of these seemingly easy-to-understand concepts among the 
general public and teachers alike. Individuals lacking domain-spe-
cific knowledge of neuroscience propagate myths about the brain’s 
role in learning by inaccurately applying neuroscientific findings 
to the field of education for purposes typically unintended by the 
original researchers.
Misconceptions. The crossover between neuroscience and 
education results from the attempted and improper application 
of neuroscientific research findings to education. Misconceptions 
found in this hybrid literature often investigated beliefs related 
to: (a) the efficacy of brain-based education, (b) hemispheric and 
modality dominance, (c) learning styles, and (d) multiple intelli-
gences (Dekker et al., 2012; Geake, 2008). While not expressly 
addressing topics of educational psychology, the misconceptions 
in many of these studies inch ever closer to the field and encom-
pass a variety of learning strategies and beliefs about intelligence 
and memory, while falling short on topics related to academic 
motivation, as displayed in Table 2.
The field of education has primarily focused on what are 
labeled “neuromyths,” “urban myths,” and “urban legends,” which 
encompass the inappropriate application of educational psychol-
ogy principles to enhance classroom learning (de Bruyckere et 
al., 2015; Kirschner & van Merriënboer, 2013). Three broad urban 
myths encountered in the field of educational psychology include: 
(a) learners as digital natives, (b) learners and their learning styles, 
and (c) learners as self-educators (2013), the crux of which is 
students are not the best judge of what constitutes effective learn-
ing. Similar to neuroscientific findings, the myths and legends apply 
results from synthetic research contexts and tend to generalize 
the findings. For instance, Tardif, Doudin, and Meylan (2015) found 
in a sample of teachers and teachers-in-training that 85% believed 
Hughes et al. 
(Study 1) 2015
Examined the extent to which 
students in various stages of edu-




agreement scale response 
format 
Doctoral students endorsed fewer 
misconceptions than master’s and 
undergraduate students, with level of 
misconception rejection varying signifi-
cantly across educational level. 
N = 670 
International sample 
of undergraduate (n = 
49), master’s (n = 83), 
and doctoral (n = 538) 
students 
Hughes et al. 
(Study 2) 2015
Attempted to determine whether 
misconception endorsement 




tionnaire (PMQ), using 
a true/false response 
format with an additional 
“unsure” option 
Students enrolled in graduate programs 
rejected significantly more misconcep-
tions and endorsed fewer misconcep-
tions than the undergraduate students. 
Graduate students also expressed 
less uncertainty than undergraduate 
students. 
N = 557
Convenience sample of 
international students 
enrolled in psychology 
undergraduate (n = 
519), master’s (n = 7), 




Compared refutational vs. direct 
instruction to determine stability 
of misconception change
39-item questionnaire, 
forced choice (A or B) 
format
Students instructed using a refutational 
approach had more enduring accuracy 
of psychological concepts than those 
instructed with traditional lecture.
N = 111
Convenience sample 
of primarily female stu-






people use one brain hemisphere more often than the other,  and 
96% believed people learn better when information is provided 
in their preferred learning style. Studies also show that teachers 
who claim to know more about the brain and have greater inter-
est in neuroscience are also more likely to endorse neuromyths 
(Dekker et al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht, Luttges, Salvarezza, & Campos, 
2015). More recently, attention has been directed toward specific 
myths related to education including: (a) myths related to learning, 
(b) neuromyths, (c) myths related to technology in education, and 
(d) myths related to educational policy (de Bruyckere et al., 2015). 
History. Even during the late 1990s the error in applying 
brain-based research to educational practice was made, alleg-
ing that allowing neuroscience to guide educational practice was 
a faulty approach (Bruer, 1997). The distinction between cogni-
tive neuroscience and the subsequent enthusiastic promotion is 
clearly made as well, further indicating that sometimes the “scien-
tific evidence flatly contradicts the brain-based claims” (Geake, 
2008, p. 124). Geake noted the various misconceptions about 
neuroscience as applied to education, although he did not clearly 
identify the need for an instrument to identify, much less mitigate, 
such faulty beliefs (2008). The field of neuroscience has prolifer-
ated wildly in recent years, driving great public interest in neuro-
myths related to ‘brain-based’ education initiatives, programs, and 
learning strategies (Beck, 2010; Pasquinelli, 2012), despite the lack 
of direct empirical evidence to support such beliefs.  A review of 
empirical work in neuromyths is exhibited in Table 3. Such neuro-
myths include the perception that individuals can effectively train 
their brain using commercial tools such as Brain Gym® and brain-
based education initiatives. 
Interest in educational myths and legends has taken hold in 
the field of educational psychology in the last several years. In 2006, 
an entire issue of Educational Psychologist was dedicated to a schol-
arly dialogue about the efficacy of multiple intelligences theory, the 
Mozart effect, and emotional intelligence, with evidence to refute 
and support these theories presented by several scholars in the 
field (Alexander, 2006; Cherniss, Extein, Goleman, & Weissberg, 
2006; Gardner & Moran, 2006; Rauscher & Hinton, 2006; Water-
house, 2006a, 2006b). Clear evidence has been presented to refute 
these mistaken educational psychology beliefs on a conceptual 
basis, but no instrument has been developed to quantitatively 
measure the existence of these beliefs among teachers or other 
populations of interest. 
Contemporary Application. The term neuromyths is 
somewhat misleading, because the actual misconceptions are not 
faulty beliefs about neuroscience specifically, rather the miscon-
ceptions arise from the inappropriate lay application of neurosci-
ence to the field of education. The misguided translation between 
neuroscientific research findings and the application of such find-
ings to education is the basis of these misconceptions: substanti-
ated, confluent findings in neuroscience research are mistakenly 
transformed and applied in ways unintended by the researchers. 
Ultimately, the misconception source (neuroscience) is not the 
issue, rather the breakdown occurs when consumers of research 
filter empirical evidence to support their beliefs (i.e., confirmation 
bias), leading to subjective evaluation and erroneous application 
of empirical data. 
Although not nearly as prolific as the psychological miscon-
ception literature, the neuromyth and education literature reveals 
great insight into the reasons underlying the proliferation of 
such beliefs among both the general public (Beck, 2010; Hercula-
no-Houzel, 2002; Pasquinelli, 2012) and educators (Dekker et al., 
2012; Pickering & Howard-Jones, 2007; Im et al., 2018). Neuro-
myths are often disseminated to consumers as brain-based 
research alongside images of the brain that lead the reader to 
more readily accept the claims as fact (McCabe & Castel, 2008), 
promoting the perceived legitimacy of such beliefs. Prior work 
in this area has aptly acknowledged the misapplication of neuro-
science research to education initiatives, including concepts of 
hemisphericity, brain plasticity, and the danger of selling unsub-
stantiated brain-based learning strategies to unwitting teachers, 
school districts, and parents (Lindell & Kidd, 2011). 
Empirical research into the prevalence of neuromyths is mini-
mal, however Dekker et al. published findings from their study 
of 242 primary and secondary teachers in the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands who expressed an existing interest in the 
neuroscience of learning (2012).  Aside from investigating the 
prevalence of neuromyths among this population, the authors also 
examined potential predictors of such beliefs (2012). Participants 
were presented with 32 statements about the brain and learn-
ing, of which 15 of the statements were neuromyths that were 
endorsed by 49% of the participating teachers on average and 
were frequently predicted by higher levels of general knowledge 
and interest in neuroscience (2012). Findings included embracing 
false beliefs such as the efficacy of learning styles in the classroom, 
the utility of exercises to improve left- and right-brain coordina-
tion, the effect of food and water intake upon brain functioning 
and academic achievement, and the pervasive myth that humans 
use only 10% of their brain (2012). Most importantly, the results 
of this study suggested that additional general knowledge related 
to the brain did not exert a protective effect against belief in 
pseudoscientific beliefs. Though this study is closely tied to our 
suggestion to develop an instrument to identify misconceptions of 
educational psychology among a population of teachers, Dekker 
et al.’s (2018) findings indicated the necessity of evaluating in 
greater depth the prevalence and predictors of misconceptions 
related to teaching and learning in a population of teachers in 
the United States. 
Summary. Much of the education literature specifically 
addressed the alleged tie between neuroscience and the field 
of education, often questioning the validity of such initiatives, 
programs, and strategies (Dekker et al., 2012; Pickering & Howard-
Jones, 2007; for reviews, see also Geake, 2008; Goswami, 2004; 
Lindell & Kidd, 2011; Purdy, 2008; Sylvan & Christodoulou, 2010). 
Pasquinelli extended this description to include the clarification 
that neuromyths “tend to survive the circulation of correct infor-
mation, and to be inflated by sensationalist press releases” (2012, p. 
90), not unlike scientific misconceptions discussed in great depth 
within the educational psychology literature (e.g., Sinatra et al. 
2014). Thus, neuromyths and misconceptions are conceptually 
indistinguishable as presented in both the education and psychol-
ogy literatures. Though one study did specifically investigate the 
prevalence of neuromyths among primary and secondary school 
teachers (Dekker et al., 2012), it was conducted in the UK and 
Netherlands and may not necessarily generalize to the population 
of teachers in other countries. 
If teachers are riddled with misconceptions about scientific 
knowledge and facts, their ability to teach effectively is undoubt-
edly compromised. The problem extends beyond the teachers and 
is carried through to their students and their students’ parents, 
creating an even broader social problem. Thus, we believe that 
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identifying whether these ill-supported beliefs also exist among 
teachers is a worthwhile pursuit. The clear delineation of these 
urban legends provides a lens through which the field should 
pinpoint more specific misconceptions that can be effectively 
measured quantitatively. Kirschner and van Merriënboer clearly 
asserted “that educators, educational policymakers and educa-
tional researchers should reject educational approaches that lack 
sufficient scientific support and methodologically sound empirical 
evidence” (2013, p. 178), however, to our knowledge there is no 
such instrument to identify the acceptance or rejection of such 
errant beliefs about educational psychology. 
MEASUREMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Although the development of an instrument to identify miscon-
ceptions is certainly not a new endeavor, existing instruments have 
methodological criticisms that must be considered and addressed 
prior to the development of new instruments. Criticisms include 
the response format, out-of-date items negated by new scien-
tific findings, test items that address topics outside the scope of 
Table 2. General Psychology Misconceptions and Neuromyths Based on Educational Concepts
Misconception Description Source(s)
Accommodating the multiple intelligences:
Teachers should tailor their instruction to accommodate their students’ different types of intelligence (e.g., 
linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, intrapersonal, interpersonal). 
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Waterhouse (2006a) 
Behaviorism concepts:
Negative reinforcement is equivalent to punishment. 
Arntzen, Lokke, Lokke, and Eilertsen (2010)
Kuhle, Barber, and Bristol (2009)
Brain development and stimuli: 
Children exposed to environments rich in stimulus have better-developed brains. 
Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012)
Brain size and intelligence:
There is a correlation between brain size and intelligence. Herculano-Houzel (2002) 
Brain training: 
One can improve their cognitive abilities by playing brain training games such as Brain Gym® de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Clarity under pressure:
Human beings think most clearly when they are under pressure. de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Creativity and schooling: 
The schooling process ruins children’s innate ability to be creative. de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Critical periods for learning:
Childhood includes critical periods after which children are no longer able to learn certain things. Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012)
Developmental differences in brain function and learning:
Education cannot mitigate learning problems in students with developmental differences in brain function. Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012)
Digital natives, technology, and education:
The new generation of learners inherently know how to learn from developing technologies and media 
and old methods of instruction do not work for them.
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Kirschner and van Merriënboer (2013)
Efficacy of discovery and self-guided learning: 
Students will learn better if they discover things for themselves rather than having their teacher explain 
everything to them. 
Instruction with minimal guidance produces better learning outcomes than does direct instruction. 
Students should be given control over what and how they are learning.
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Holmes (2016) 
Kirschner and van Merriënboer (2013)
Efficacy of rote memorization:
Repeated exposure to the same information, also known as rote learning, improves learning
Holmes (2016) 
Kuhle, Barber, and Bristol (2009)
Efficacy of teaching to students’ learning style:
Students will learn material better and academic achievement will increase if instruction is presented to 
students in their preferred learning style. 
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012)
Kirschner and van Merriënboer (2013)
First- and second-language acquisition:
It is important that a child acquires their native language before attempting to learn a second language, 
otherwise neither language will be learned. Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012)
Gender and learning differences:
Males and females have fundamentally different brains and therefore do not learn in the same ways. 
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Gender difference in math achievement:
Boys are inherently better at mathematics than girls. de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Hemisphericity of the brain: 
People are either left-brained and analytical or right-brained and creative. 
Coordination exercises can improve integration between a student’s left- and right-brain to facilitate 
learning. 
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, and Jolles (2012)
Lyddy and Hughes (2012)
Intelligence and heredity:
Intelligence is the result of genetics and cannot be changed by education or life experience. Herculano-Houzel (2002) 
Knowledge obsolescence: 
Knowledge has become obsolete with the advent of the internet.
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Learning while asleep:
People have the ability to learn new information while they are sleeping.
Brown (1983) 
Lyddy and Hughes (2012) 
Standing and Huber (2003) 
Memory and age: 
Adults cannot memorize information as easily as children can. Kuhle, Barber, and Bristol (2009)
Multitasking:
People are capable of effectively multitasking with more than one thinking tasks without a loss of concen-
tration or loss of accuracy. 
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Nature of human memory:
Human brains have a single memory system where every memory is permanently stored.  
de Bruyckere, Kirschner, and Hulshof (2015)
Herculano-Houzel (2002) 




introductory psychology textbooks, ambiguously worded items, 
and vulnerability of the true/false format test to acquiescence and 
correct guessing due to chance alone (Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; 
Hughes, Lyddy, & Kaplan, 2013; Ruble, 1986; Taylor & Kowalski, 
2012).  A major drawback in prior measurement of misconcep-
tions is the overuse of true/false response formats, items which 
do a poor job of detecting misconceptions (McCutcheon, 1991), in 
addition to constraining responses to be wholly true or false and 
inflating estimates of misconceptions due to acquiescence (Bens-
ley et al., 2014).  Additionally, aside from the difficulty of construct-
ing effective true/false questions, they are also more likely to yield 
response bias and potential overestimation of misconceptions 
(Taylor & Kowalski, 2012). 
Four decades ago, recommendations were advanced for 
future researchers to construct less ambiguous items and to 
include study findings “hotly debated by psychologists” (Ruble, 
1986, p. 36).  We concur, and contend that our proposed definition 
of misconceptions allows for the inclusion only of items that are 
explicitly refuted by empirical evidence. We also note that miscon-
ceptions by definition do not comprise a relative lack of domain 
knowledge, therefore a response option indicating the partici-
pant’s lack of knowledge should be conspicuous and distinct from 
the ordinary Likert-scale (e.g., Lyddy & Hughes, 2012). Conflating 
a ‘neutral’ scale response and ‘don’t know’ response into a single 
scale point undoubtedly skews the results, generating faulty inter-
pretations and misguided inferences. 
While earlier work led to the development of a new 
psychology misconceptions instrument that remedied many 
such criticisms of Vaughan’s widely-used Test of Common Beliefs 
(McCutcheon, 1991;  Vaughan, 1977), these criticisms have been 
explicitly addressed in more recent studies evaluating the impact 
of response format and item language upon misconception 
frequency (Hughes et al., 2013a;  Taylor & Kowalski, 2012). Recent 
efforts have been made to quantitatively address earlier criticisms 
concerning the assessment of misconceptions. Taylor and Kowalski 
(2012) studied introductory psychology students and compared 
the efficacy for accurately assessing psychology misconceptions 
of true/false versus forced choice formats in which respondents 
were asked to select the ‘most true’ of two provided options. 
Their study revealed that the true/false format resulted in an 
accuracy rate of only 33.05%, while the forced choice format 
resulted in a 41.29% accuracy rate, suggesting that the true/false 
format resulted in an overestimation of misconceptions among 
their sample. It was also inferred that misconception prevalence 
may fluctuate over time and samples, suggesting that future 
researchers conduct a pretest of their instrument and consider 
the possibility of cohort effects within their results (2012). Mean-
while, other psychology misconceptions researchers were concur-
rently examining analogous methodological concerns in this area. 
Similar to Taylor and Kowalski’s measurement study, Hughes 
et al. (2013a) conducted a systematic investigation of the impact 
of response format and item language upon endorsement of 
psychological misconceptions. Their study included four alter-
native 40-item questionnaires composed of 30 misconceptions 
and 10 filler items tested among a population of undergraduates 
in the United States and Europe. Question phrasing (ambiguous 
versus non-ambiguous) and response format (true/false versus 
seven-point Likert scale) were manipulated by the research-
ers among the randomly assigned groups, and the results indi-
cated both the response format of the instrument and the item 
language independently inflated the estimation of misconcep-
tions. The authors suggested that future researchers include items 
based upon distinct criteria rather than subjective judgment and 
employ alternate techniques beyond the narrow realm of self-re-
port questionnaires (2013b). Taken together, Taylor and Kowalski 
(2012) and Hughes et al.’s (2013a) findings suggest that much 
improvement can be made in the construction of such instru-
ments to measure misconceptions.
For the past six years, the authors have worked toward 
developing a validated instrument to identify misconceptions 
about various educational psychology concepts to conceivably be 
used with populations of both pre-service and in-service teachers 
(McAfee & Hoffman, 2014; McAfee, Xu, & Hoffman, 2015; McAfee, 
Xu, & Hoffman, 2016a; McAfee, Xu, & Hoffman, 2016b, Hoffman 
& McAfee, 2017). Several iterations of the proposed instrument 
have included as few as 15 to as many as 60 misconception items. 
The response format has consistently incorporated a seven-point 
Likert-scale for level of respondent agreement, although the first 
iteration also included a response for the respondent’s level of 
confidence in each item. Requesting respondent confidence level 
reduced the response rate and thus confidence assessments 
were eliminated in future iterations.  All instruments to date have 
included a response option for “I have no knowledge” to ensure 
that lack of knowledge was not conflated with genuine miscon-
ceptions. 
As a result of the piloted studies, we have identified 15 partic-
ularly pervasive misconceptions about educational psychology. 
Although factor structure instability has stalled the final valida-
tion of our instrument with pre-service teachers, we believe 
our efforts are a first step toward the development of a reli-
able measure of educational psychology misconceptions. Concur-
rently, while using a repeated measures design, we are investigating 
whether effective measurement of misconceptions is influenced 
by item valence (exclusively positive vs. mixed, positive and nega-
tive), scale type (true/false vs. Likert-type), or order of presenta-
tion (true/false vs. Likert-type).
DISCUSSION
Within this review, we summarized misconceptions in the fields 
of psychology and education and highlighted the theoretical, infer-
ential, and measurement concerns specifically related to the field 
of educational psychology, revealing several themes. In the field of 
psychology, misconceptions are frequently addressed among vari-
ous populations, but attention to measurement concerns are mini-
mal and many findings are ambiguous. While misconceptions in 
the field of educational psychology are often studied, they are too 
often focused exclusively upon scientific and metaphysical miscon-
ceptions and neglect to address misconceptions among teach-
ers-in-training regarding effective teaching strategies. Ironically, 
educational psychologists conduct a great deal of science miscon-
ceptions research on teacher populations but fail to consider the 
misconceptions those same individuals hold about their own field. 
Significant research has been conducted to determine the most 
effective methods for eliminating misconceptions, however, to 
initiate the process of eliminating educational psychology miscon-
ceptions, appropriate instrumentation must first be developed. 
Misconceptions have broad social impacts, regardless 
whether the ill-founded belief is related to the nature of learning, 
the validity of brain-based education, or medically-based, such as 
choosing whether to vaccinate a child. However, misconceptions 
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are particularly deleterious for educators because they are highly 
resistant to extinction, can affect the ability of students to learn 
new information, and may signal the need for additional critical 
thinking training (Hammer, 1996; Hughes et al., 2013a; Muis, Sinatra, 
Pekrun, Winne, Trevors, Losenno, & Munzar, 2018).  When teachers 
carry misconceptions of educational psychology into their class-
room, the risk of using poorly informed techniques and instruc-
tional tools becomes problematic. It therefore stands to reason 
that misconceptions about educational psychology among teach-
ers are particularly harmful and direct efforts should be taken to 
mitigate these misconceptions.
Strategies to Mitigate Misconceptions
We rely on conceptual change literature and advocate a six-step 
process to mitigate educational psychology misconceptions. First, 
to overcome these damaging misconceptions we must be able to 
effectively measure the prevalence and depth of these miscon-
ceptions, a task that requires the production of a pragmatic and 
operationalized definition of misconceptions, as we proposed 
earlier.  Second, misconceptions about various topics exist among 
a variety of populations and are typically overcome through a 
conceptual change or argumentation protocol that incorporates 
some sort of cognitive conflict or dissatisfaction with an existing 
belief (Gregoire, 2003; Muis et al., 2018), motivation to change that 
belief, and a plausible, comprehensible, and coherent piece of accu-
rate information (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). While various conceptual 
change models have been validated, we assert Gregoire’s Cogni-
tive-Affective Model of Conceptual Change (CAMCC; 2003) is the 
most appropriate model to employ when attempting to change 
the beliefs of pre-service teachers about educational psychology 
topics. The CAMCC is beneficial in this circumstance because it 
addresses typical conceptual change processes (e.g., dissonance 
and plausibility and intelligibility of correct conception) while also 
incorporating affective and motivational factors relevant to chang-
ing the belief (Gregoire, 2003; Muis et al., 2018). 
Third, to facilitate such conceptual change from these miscon-
ceptions to evidence-supported conceptions of educational 
psychology, a refutational text or lecture seems most appropriate 
given its prior success in knowledge restructuring in psychology 
and education research (Bensley et al., 2014; Broughton, Sinatra, & 
Reynolds, 2010; Kowalski & Taylor, 2009, 2017; Sinatra & Brough-
Table 3. Empirical studies of neuromyths





among the general public 
95-item survey, using a yes/
no/I don’t know response 
format
Neuroscience literacy was improved by level 
of education, in addition to reading of popular 
science magazines, with the worst neurosci-
ence illiteracy occurring on topics related to 
learning and memory. 
n = 2,158
Members of the general 
public in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 




mine the prevalence and 
predictors for belief in 
neuromyths
32-item questionnaire with 
statements related to the 
brain and learning, including 
15 neuromyth items, using 
a correct/incorrect/do not 
know response format
An average of 49% of teachers in the study be-
lieved in the neuromyths and were particularly 
prone to belief in neuromyths perpetuated 
by commercialized education programs, and 
additional general knowledge among the 
teachers predicted increased endorsement of 
the neuromyths.
n = 242 
Primary and secondary 
school teachers from the 
UK and Holland with an 
expressed interest relat-
ed to the neuroscience 
of learning
Gleichgerrcht, Lutt-
ges, Salvarezza, and 
Campos (2015)
Attempted to evaluate 
belief in neuromyths 
among a specific popula-
tion of teachers.
Used a revised version of 
Dekker et al.’s (2012) instru-
ment, including 12 neuromyth 
items, using a correct/incor-
rect/do not know response 
format
Findings were consistent with prior research 
in other geographic areas that neuroscience 
misconceptions were frequently endorsed, and 
often related to factual information about brain 
structure and function. Additional self-reported 
knowledge about the brain predicted likeli-
hood for belief in neuromyths as well.
N = 3,451 
Teachers in Latin America 
from Argentine (n = 551), 
Chile (n = 598), Peru (n 
= 2,222) and other Latin 
American countries (n 
= 80)
Tardif, Doudin, and 
Meylan (2015)
Evaluation of beliefs in 
neuromyths among teach-
ers and student teachers, 
specifically in terms of 
hemispheric dominance, 
modality dominance, and 
the Brain Gym© method.
15-item neuromyth ques-
tionnaire, using a four-point 
Likert scale for agreement, 
utility, and frequency of use
Findings were consistent with prior studies, 
and extended Dekker et al.’s (2012) findings by 
establishing that teachers and student teachers 
expressed belief in hemispheric and modality 
dominance claims and recommendations were 
made to provide close collaboration between 
neuroscience and educators to produce critical 
evaluation of pedagogical approaches.
n = 283
Teachers and student 
teachers in Switzerland, 
including in-service high 
school teachers (n = 44), 
college teachers (n = 
57), first-year primary 
student teachers (n = 
160), teachers’ trainers 
(n = 22)
Furnham (2018)
Examined the prevalence 
of psychological miscon-
ceptions in developmen-
tal and neuro-psychology 
based on surveys derived 
from two published 
books
Largely a descriptive study 
that employed both a T/F 
option and the ability to 
indicate “no knowledge” of a 
misconception.
Findings indicated that up to 50% of items 
were indicated as true (indicating a miscon-
ception). 
n = 220
51.8% were men and 
48.2% were women. They 
ranged in age from 19 to 
66 years, with the mean 
age was 35.74 years
Im, Cho, Dubinsky 
and Varma
(2018)
Sought to determine if 
taking an educational 
psychology course would 
mitigate neuromyths.
60 neuroscience literacy and 
belief in neuromyth items, 47 
items were adapted from 
Dekker et al. (2012). 
Findings revealed that participants in the 
experimental group (M = 5.84) believed more 
neuromyths than participants in the control 
group (M = 4.47).  Leading the authors to 
conclude that taking an educational psychology 
course does not mediate misconceptions.
n = 99
Korean sophomore 
pre-service teachers. 50 
experimental subjects 
(35=female, age = 20.86 
years) with a control 
group of 49 participants 





ton, 2011; Tippett, 2010).  The conditions under which refutational 
instruction will facilitate conceptual change include the learner’s 
recognition of the inadequacy of their prior knowledge to solve 
a new problem, along with intelligibility, plausibility, and utility of 
the incoming information (Tippett, 2010). Such a protocol would 
include a statement of the misconception followed by the creation 
of doubt through the explanation of why that misconception is 
invalid and a statement of an evidence-based accurate claim about 
the topic and why that claim is acceptable and valid (Hynd, 2001).
Fourth, considering the recent evidence amassed on the 
precarious, yet influential nature of pre-service teacher epistemic 
cognition, beliefs, stances, and aims on knowledge formation and 
conceptual development (Barzilai & Chinn, 2018; Braten et al., 
2017; Lunn Brownlee et al., 2017; Ferguson & Brownlee, 2018) a 
focus on how pre-service teachers evaluate, assess, and understand 
the credibility of evidence is essential. This aspect of misconcep-
tion mediation is especially crucial because pre-service teacher 
candidates are inclined to place more emphasis on the certainty 
of knowledge (Ferguson & Brownlee, 2018), and implicitly trust 
in-service teachers, while also deferring to personal experience 
when learning (Bråten & Ferguson, 2015).  Accurate conceptions 
of teaching and learning are hindered by the tendency of pre-ser-
vice teachers to gravitate toward popular trends that result in 
“jumping on the band wagon every time a new research report 
or educational product is launched” (Ferguson & Brownlee, 2018, 
p. 107). Like Lunn Brownlee et al. (2017), we advocate emphasis 
on epistemic reflexivity that examines the internal dialogues of 
teacher candidates as an important misconception mitigation 
strategy.
Fifth, mitigating misconceptions, regardless of the field in 
which the mistaken belief exists, must be conducted by facilitating 
conceptual change in the individual to overcome the inaccurate 
belief and replace it with a new and accurate belief. The concep-
tual change process is particularly challenging because pre-in-
structional, inaccurate conceptions are likely to interfere with 
the process of learning accurate information (Chinn & Malhotra, 
2002).  Anomalous data that clearly refutes the belief has been 
used extensively in the facilitation of conceptual change to reme-
diate misconceptions. Thus, it seems that providing teachers with 
anomalous data that directly contradicts their existing conception 
of an inappropriate teaching practice should in theory combat 
their misconception immediately. However, this is unlikely to 
occur because individuals will often resist this change and instead 
persistently retain their existing conception while rejecting the 
new, accurate information to protect their entrenched belief, 
often satisfying a robust personal or social goal (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993). Prior research has revealed that emotions dominate the 
restructuring of knowledge when individuals are confronted with 
evidence that conflicts with their belief, moderating learning strat-
egies (Muis et al., 2018; Sinatra et al., 2014). Thus, simply presenting 
pre-service teachers with information that contradicts their belief 
is insufficient to initiate belief change. We thus suggest the devel-
opment of a conceptual change protocol that considers affec-
tive and motivational factors relevant to teacher belief systems. 
This type of approach was proposed by Gregoire (2003) and is 
pivotal in mitigating inaccurate beliefs about educational psychol-
ogy among teachers.
Last, the conceptual change process is often tested in the 
field of educational psychology on prospective teachers to over-
come these potentially harmful beliefs.  As suggested by Hughes 
et al. (2013b), various methods beyond simple self-report ques-
tionnaires should be employed to truly understand the origin 
and nature of these inaccurate beliefs. In addition, based on the 
proclivity of psychology research to rely almost exclusively on 
WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) 
research samples (Rad, Martingano, & Ginges, 2018), we advocate 
inclusion of more diverse research populations to determine 
whether conceptual change efforts related to teaching, learning, 
and motivation are culturally determined and nuanced. 
The information gleaned from qualitative inquiries related 
to these misconceptions would also provide a useful baseline 
to inform the development of techniques to restructure under-
standings of these important topics of educational psychology. 
For instance, operational conceptual change protocols could be 
developed after careful evaluation of the origin and nature of 
these misconceptions and the values and epistemic aims these 
teachers tie to their mistaken beliefs. Such protocols could be 
employed in undergraduate teacher education coursework to 
mitigate these misconceptions and obstruct deeper entrench-
ment of the beliefs.  A review of teacher education programs and 
in-service teacher trainings should help teachers become more 
aware of their personal beliefs and how those beliefs influence 
pedagogy and motivational strategies. By continuing to adhere 
to absolutist beliefs (Schommer, 1990), teachers are shortchang-
ing their students and perpetuating their own personal biases 
onto their students rather than promoting empirically-supported 
constructs. However, any change to be implemented among teach-
ers will require the buy-in of school administrators and districts 
who should be charged with reevaluating the teaching methods 
employed in their classrooms, schools, and districts. 
It therefore follows that mitigating misconceptions may bene-
fit from a mixed-methods approach. Such an approach should 
include a validated instrument to measure the misconceptions, 
followed by think-aloud protocols with the appropriate popu-
lation of individuals to determine their underlying values and 
motives as applied to their mistaken beliefs. The development of 
refutational texts to overcome such misconceptions is facilitated 
by the qualitative information gathered through the think-aloud 
protocols that provide insight regarding general beliefs, misunder-
standings, and origins of the misconceptions, which can be used to 
specifically argue against the faulty conception. Eventually, the use 
of appropriate refutational texts that incorporate key epistemic 
emotions (Muis et al., 2018) can be used in conjunction with the 
instrument to more immediately overcome the misconceptions 
through simple instruction in teacher professional development 
sessions. 
LIMITATIONS
As is the case with most research endeavors, this review is 
not without limitations.  As mentioned previously, this was not 
intended to be an exhaustive review of the literature. Because 
of the expansiveness and breadth of fields in which misconcep-
tions occur, we limited our search to the fields of psychology 
and education. Within these fields, we found an abundance of 
research to guide our inquiry and believe it is sufficient to make 
an informed decision about the necessity of future inquiries in this 
line of research.  Additionally, the literature search was restricted 
to peer-reviewed publications in English and did not include other 
potentially relevant searches such as dissertations, popular media 
such as Psychology Today, or other trade magazines due to the 
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difficulty of performing an exhaustive search of all potentially rele-
vant sources outside the scope of academic publications. 
CONCLUSION
Altogether, this review has led to insight regarding the state of 
misconceptions in educational psychology. The first step toward 
mediating misconceptions among teacher populations is to 
develop methodologically sound instrumentation. Without solid 
measurement, an explicit remediation strategy remains untenable. 
Using such an instrument to identify the prevalence and strength 
of these misconceptions should also lead to necessary improve-
ments in teacher training where many of these misconceptions 
likely originate. This review has also revealed that many studies 
clearly identify the problem of myths, legends, and misconceptions, 
but there is a paucity of literature concerning misconceptions 
among teachers. Thus, we advocate refutational approaches to 
discipline-specific conceptual change efforts rather than those 
that exclusively attempt to mitigate science misconceptions. 
Finally, we encourage researchers to explore new areas of inquiry 
that identify under which conditions misconception revision is 
enhanced. Currently our own research is examining whether epis-
temic stances toward various instructional modalities (face-to-face, 
online, blended) are preferential to induce durable knowledge 
revision.  As suggested above, we are also using populations other 
than undergraduate education majors for the source of our data 
collection.  We encourage others to extend our efforts.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: 
bobby.hoffman@ucf.edu
Note: This work is based on the dissertation of Morgan A. McAfee, 
however the authors shared equally in the construction of this 
manuscript for publication. 
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